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CONTRACT — OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE — PLACE OF 
CONTRACTING — COMMUNICATION BY “TELEX”
. Both plaintiffs in London and defendant’s agents in Amsterdam 
had in their offices equipment known as Telex service by which mes­
sages could be dispatched by a teleprinter operated like a typewriter in 
one country and almost instantaneously received and typed in another. 
The plaintiffs desired to make a contract with the defendant’s agents 
in Amsterdam for the purchase of coppcr cathodes from the defendant 
corporation. A series of communications by Telex passed between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant’s agents, the material ones for the present 
purposes being a counter-offer made bv the plaintiffs on September 
8, 1954 and an acceptance of that offer by the Dutch agents on behalf 
of the defendant received by the plaintiffs in London by Telex on 
September 10, 1954. The plaintiffs alleged there had been a breach of 
the contract by the defendant. They applied under Order 11, rule 1 of 
the English Rules of Court for leave to serve notice of a writ on the 
defendant in New York on the ground that the contract was made in 
England. It was contended for the defendant that the contract was 
made in Holland. The application was granted by a master whose 
decision was affirmed by Donovan, J. The Court of Appeal affirmed 
Donovan, J .’s decision unanimously. Entores v. Miles Far East 
Corporation, [1955] 3 W . L. R. 48.
Order 11, rule 1 of the English Rules of Court provides in part 
that service out of the jurisdiction of a notice of a writ of summons 
may be allowed by the Court or Judge in an action to recover damages 
for the breach of a contract made within the jurisdiction.1 Thus in 
this case the order could be granted if it were held that the contract 
was made when the message appeared on the Telex receiver in London, 
but not if the acceptance was effective on its transmission in Holland.
The general rule is that acceptance of an offer of a bilateral con­
tract must be communicated to tne offeror unless he has waived such 
communication by indicating some other mode. It would follow that 
the place of making is the place of receipt. W here, however, an offer 
is made by post, tne rule is that the contract is concluded when and 
presumably where the letter of acceptance is posted. The Court of 
Appeal had to decide whether communication by Telex fell within 
the general rule or was so closely analogous to postal communication as 
to fall within that special category. Guidance could be sought in cases 
dealing with telephonic and telegraphic communication.
1. R. S. C ., Ord. 11, s. 1. (e) (1).
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The law concerning telephonic and telegraphic communications 
is, however, not clear. The case law seemed to show a tendency to 
treat these cases as being similar in effect to the letter cases. In 
Cowan v. O'Connor, 2 for example, it was held that acceptance of 
an offer by telegram is made when and where the acceptance is handed 
to the telegraph company for transmission. Hawkins, }. said:
"I think that where, as here, a person opens a correspondence 
and initiates a transaction by telegram he must he treated as 
though he were, through it, speaking to the person to whom 
such telegram is directed, at the place to which he directs it 
to be sent, and where he intends it to be delivered; and if he 
desires a reply by telegram, such a reply must be considered 
as given to him at the telegraph office from whence such reply 
is despatched.”3
The same principle was applied in Carow Towing Co. v. The “Ed  
M cW illiams,” 4 a telephone case. It was held that a contract proposed 
and accepted over the telephone is made where the words of acceptance 
are spoken. In the Exchequer Court, Hodgins, J. said: “His reply at 
the telephone is of the same effect as if he had posted a letter or sent off 
a telegram from an office in Ontario.”5 Professors Williston and 
W infield have, however, taken a different view on the time and place 
of making a contract by telephone. Professor Winfield has written:
“It is submitted that there is no communication until the 
reply actually comes to the knowledge of the offeror. In the 
first place, the telephone is much more like conversation face 
to face than an exchange of letters. It is a mere technicality 
to say that just because the Post Office has control of the 
telephone, it ought to be subject to exactly the same rules as 
govern letters . . . .  the rule about acceptance by post was 
laid down before the telephone was generally known or used.”'»
Professor Williston expressed the hope that “. . . . the principles 
applicable to contracts between parties in the presence of each other 
will be applied to negotiations by telephone.”7
The telephone and telegraph cases could give the court no sure 
guidance in the present case. Denning, L. }., said, . . There is no clear 
rule about contracts made by telephone or by Telex.”8 But contracts 
by Telex, being instaneous, fell more naturally, he thought, within 
the general rule governing acceptance. The conclusion ne reached 
was:
2. (1888 ) 20 Q. B . D. 640.
3. Ibid., a t p. 642.
4. (1919) 46 D. L . R . 506.
5. Ibid., a t p. 508.
6. W in field , Som e A sp ects o f O ffer and  A ccep tan ce , (1939) 55 Law  Q. R ev. 499, a t 
p. 514.
7. W illiston  on C o n tracts  (R evised  ed. 1936), s. 82, p. 239.
8. [1955] 3 W . L . R . 48. a t  p. 50.
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. . . I hat the rule about instantaneous communications 
between the parties is different from the rule about the post.
The contract is only complete when the acceptance is re­
ceived by the offeror: and the contract is made at the place 
where the acceptance is received.”»
Birkctt, L. J. agreed:
"The ordinary rule of law, to which the special considerations 
governing contracts by post are exceptions, is that the ac­
ceptance of an offer must be communicated to the offeror, 
and the place where the contract is made is the place where 
the offeror receives the notification of the acceptance by the 
offeree.”io
Parker, L. J. referred to the judgment of Thesiger, L. J. in Household  
Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co. v. Grant, 11 . . in which 
he points out that where the parties are at a distance the balance of 
convenience dictates that the contract shall be deemed complete when 
the acceptance is handed to the Post Office.”12 But in contracts made 
by instantaneous communication there is no need for any such rule of 
convenience; the normal rule governing the formation of contracts 
should apply.
This case is important because of the international scope of modern 
business and its use of methods of instantaneous communication. The 
case has laid down a workable principle logically arrived at.
Donald F. MacGowan, I Law, U.N.B.
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